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I. Should the District Court have suppressed the Marijuana 
seized on or about September 16, 1985 and other evidence derived 
from such seizure pursuant to Section 77-35-12 of the Utah Code 
of Criminal Procedure in that such search and seizure was in 
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution. 
II. Should the District Court have supressed all marijuana 
seized on or about September 16, 1985, and all other evidence 
derived from such seizure pursuant to Section 77-35-12 of the 
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure in that such search and seizure 
was in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State 
Constitution. 
III. Based upon the evidence introduced at the non-jury 
trial, was the evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict of 
guilty of the charge of production of a controlled substance in 
violation of Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) U. C. A. (1953), as amended. 
The Defendant was charged pursuant to Count I of the 
1 
Information with unlawful production of a controlled substance, a 
third degree felony, in violation of §58-37-8(1)(a)(i), U. C. A. 
(1953), as amended, and pursuant to Count II of the Information 
with possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, 
in violation of §58-37-8(2)(a)(i), D. C. A. (1953), as amended. 
After a non-jury trial held on January 16, 1986, before the 
Honorable George E. Ballif, Judge, presiding, the defendant was 
found guilty of Count I of the Information and the defendant was 
further found not guilty as to Count II of the Information. 
The sentence of the defendant was reduced to an alternative 
normally applicable to the offense of a class A misdemeanor and 
judgement and conviction for a class A misdemeanor offense was 
imposed and the defendant was sentenced accordingly on the 7th day 
of February, 1986. The defendant's sentence was suspended and he 
was placed on probation and ordered to serve two days in the Utah 
County Jail as a condition of his probation. 
The defendant's motion for the issuance of a certificate of 
probable cause and stay of sentence was granted and the defendant 
was released on his own recognizance pending appeal of this matter 
(R. 112). 
The defendant, Allan R. Watts, and his wife, Debbie Watts, were 
charged pursuant to Informations filed on the 17th day of 
September, 1985, charging them with two third degree felonies 
occuring on or about September 16, 1985, to wit: Count I: 
Unlawful Production of a Controlled Substance in violation of 
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Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(i), D. C. A. (1953) , as amended and Count 
II: Possession of a Controlled Substance in violaton of Section 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i), U. C. A. (1953), as amended (R. 5, R. 9). 
The defendants, Allan R. Watts and Debbie Watts, filed a motion 
to Supress in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, 
State of Utah, on the basis that all marijuana seized on or about 
September 16, 1985, and all derivative evidence was seized 
illegally pursuant to Section 77-35-12 of the Utah Code of 
Criminal Procedure in that such search and seizure was in 
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and were in violation of Article 1, Section 
14 of the Utah State Constitution (R. 16)• 
A hearing was held before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, 
Judge pro-tern on the 15th day of November, 1985, on the 
defendants motion to suppress (R. 122). 
On September 16, 1985, at 11:00 a.m. Dectective Brad Latham 
received information from a confidential informant regarding a 
location of some marijuana plants in a greenhouse behind the 
residence occupied by the defendants (R. 131-132). 
In exchange for the information that the confidential 
informant supplied to the Provo City Police, the confidential 
informant was to have a criminal charge or charges dismissed 
against him (R. 133-134). 
The Provo City Police did not tell the confidential informant 
directly which person or persons he or she was to gather data on 
but only that such confidential informant was told to gain data 
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on a prosecutable charge (R. 134-135). 
After the confidential informant notified the police at 11:00 
a.m. on the 16th day of September/ 1985f the confidential 
informant took the Provo City Police to the house that the 
defendants occupied (R. 135) 
The Provo City Police Officers did not enter onto the 
property at that time but simply observed the make-shift 
greenhouse from several different directions (R. 135). 
The Provo City Police Department did not tell the 
confidential informant that he could trespass or travel on 
person's property or do anything that might be contrary to law in 
order to obtain criminal evidence nor did they give him any 
direction as to what he could or could not do in obtaining evidence 
(R. 136). 
The defendants were called to the stand pursuant to Rule 104 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence pertaining to questions of 
admissability of evidence (R. 138-139, 124). 
According to the Police Report, the confidental informant 
gained his information on the morning of the 16th and the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant were aware of such fact (R. 151). At 
any rate, both defendants testified that they did not give .any 
person permission to be on their premises during the 24 hour 
period stated in the Affidavit (R. 8) from 3:15 p.m. Sunday, 
September 15, 1985 through 3:15 p.m. Monday, September 16, 1985, 
when the search warrant was executed in front of the Circuit 
Court Judge. (R. 140-143, R. 124, R. 151). 
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Artoidinq I* I he /ffidavil in >upj.oit I" issuance oi search 
warrant, the confidential informant had proved his reliability to 
the Provo City Police Department within the past 3t days and 
within the last «. I I tu hd<l 1 eivtU tl I a l 4 large plants 
being grown JJI a makeshift greenhouse located behind a residence 
at ! Hi foutl Ui West, Pi »vo. (R. 8). 
Officer Latham testified that the confidential informant saw 
the marijuana and that the marijuana could not be seen 
from the road M I <l I I I IK L I i H P K M V I IK II n i luana from l { L 
road (R. 137), Additionally the makeshift greenhouse 
contain* tl f w< rooms divided by two separate doors and the 
marijuana was not open to public view or exposure (P. 167-1 "0). 
See also Plaintiff's Exhibit #5 (R. 121). The marijuana that was 
growing wd ii (In e< und H mn * r serond section UK 1681, Tl* 
make-shift shed had two doors on such shed (R. 166, R. 3 69), 
It is clear from the foregoing facts that the confidential 
informant was in fact trespassing# and at an tatv the (obit said 
as much on the Record (R. 145). At any rate, the prosecution 
never introduced uv w i II-MITC- It r e1 u t € tht defendants' statement 
that the confidential informant was >n f lien property without the 
defendants1 consent and therefore was illegally trespassing on 
their f i o^ ei t^  . 
The Honorable Allen B. Sorensen ruled that on the record 
before him there was insufficient evidence to indicate the 
informant and the Police Department were operating under an 
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agency relationship which would constitute the informant in fact 
functioned as a police agent exercising police power. The Court 
further found that nothing was seized, but that something was 
observed, according to the affidavit of the Officer Latham (R. 
152). See also Appendix A of the Court1s Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 22). 
Even though the Court directed the prosecution to draft the 
Findings of Facts and serve them on defense counsel (R. 152), the 
prosecution did not do so (R. 22) and the Court refused to amend 
its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law after notified by 
the defendants of their objections to such Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law and Order. (R. 37). 
Thomas H. Means filed his entry of appearance as attorney of 
record for the Defendant, Debbie Watts on the 3rd day of 
December, 1985 (R. 31). Additionally, Debbie Watts, by and 
through her attorney of record, Thomas H. Means, moved to have 
the trial of his client, Debbie Watts, severed and heard 
separately from the Defendant Allan R. Watts (R. 34) and such 
motion to sever was granted on December 13, 1985 (R. 159-160). 
Trial in this matter was held on January 16, 1986 in an 
non-jury trial before the Honorable George E. Ballif, Judge in 
the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah 
(R. 157). 
On the 16th day of September, 1985, Tim Meyer executed a 
search warrant (R. 163-164). Officer Meyer drew a diagram of a 
residence and a makeshift shed listed as Plaintifffs exhibit #5 
(R. 121). 
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Office! fievtM injjoaleii I licit t IK J evidence was surrounded by 
a three sided fence (R. 165), Officer Meyer located three 
marijuana plants growing in i-':ir second section of the makeshift 
greenhouse (R. ] 6 B, IR. J 8 9, 
The evidence indicated that someone had been producing and 
growing roa i i ]ii«in«i in I he struriiirp M-1. ' *<))• Also, the 
makeshift greenhouse was located behind the residence of 1498 
South 500 West, Provo, Utah (R. 170). 
Defense counse1 objected to a11 J tems sei zed or resu11i ng 
from the search (R 1 71-1 7 
Officer Meyer indicated that the distance between the house 
and the makeshift greenhouse was approximately 50 feet (R. 
177). 
Office! Latham testified that the Defendant Allan R. Watts1 
name was listed in the telephone book, and that during the 
booking procedure he listed his name and address as 1498 South 
500 West, Provo, Utah (R. 179). See also Findings of Facts 
hereto attached as Appendix B (R. 88). 
The dwe.l ] i i"uj IJIICU nt t lie above- referred to address was 
described as a single family dwelling (R. 181). 
Officer Latham testified that the Defendant occupied the 
single family dwelling along with his wi fe, Debbi e Watts and 
their children (R. 1 81-182), 
The Court made specific Findings of Fact in support of its 
guilty verdict. See Appendix E (R. 88) . 
The defendant objected upon the basis it was resulted from an 
7 
illegal search and seizure (R. 171, R. 192-195). The Court found 
the defendant guilty as to Count I of the Information and not 
guilty as to Count II of the Information (R. 219)* 
The trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting the 
marijuana seized on or about September 16, 1985, together with all 
evidence derived from such seizure and such evidence should have 
been suppressed pursuant to Section 77-35-12 of the Utah Code of 
Criminal Procedure in that such search and seizure was in 
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Consititution and was in violation of Article I, Section 
14 of the Utah State Constitution. 
The verdict of the trial court should be reversed in that the 
evidence is insufficient to sustain the charge against the 
defendant, Allan R. Watts, that he did unlawfully produce a 




THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING THE MARIJUANA AND ALL 
DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE SEIZED ON OR ABOUT SEPTEMBER 16, 1985, 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 77-35-12 OF THE UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE IN THE SUCH SEARCH AND SEIZURE WAS IN VIOLATION 
OF THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 
It is well settled by Biy&SaaJfcUB£££S§IL' 256 u- s- 465 
(1921) that the Fourth Amendment is a limitation upon the federal 
government as we]] as state governments only, and that 
consequently, evidence secured by private illegal searches need 
not be excluded from a criminal trial. 
On the other hand, "Quite clearly, a search is not private in 
nature if it has been ordered or requested by a government 
official." Wayne R. LaFavee, Searches and Seizures, Section 
1.6(b) (1978). 
It is clear from the foregoing record that the confidential 
informant was an agent of the police and was not acting in a 
I'- ' • ^ S ^ « X ^ i ^ i i ^ ^ £ ^ e £ I 6 3 A.2d 337 (DC. App. 
I960); SJ^ te,..V,»-.Bgfii1Ch 13 Or. App. 415, 509 P.2d 1232 (1973). 
The search by the confidential informant was clearly in joint 
operation with the Provo City Police, and therefore, illegal, 
§,%S^M2IL^^a§M&^iS^^m^L 70 Cal. 2d 97, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575, 
447 P. 2d 967 (1968). 
As stated earlier private conduct is brought within the 
inhibitions of the Fourth Amendment if it has been ordered or 
requested by a government official by asking the private party to 
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make a search or by accompanying the party to make the search 
& U a O £ ^ 367 F- 2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966); fi£§g£L2^ 
£&s&££ 223 F- SuPP 5 4 4 (DNJ 1963), afffd per curiam 332 F.2d 794 
(3rd Cir. (1964). 
Officer Brad leatham testified that a confidential informant 
had told the police that he had observed three or four marijuana 
plants on the morning of September 16, 1985, growing in a 
makeshift type greenhouse at the address of 1498 South 500 West/ 
Provo, Utah. 
According to the Affidavit in Support of Issuance of a Search 
Warrant, the confidential informant had given the Provo Police 
reliable information on at least one previous occasion in the 
past. 
Officer Leatham testified at the Suppression Hearing that the 
confidential informant was supplying the information to the Provo 
City Police Department in return for having criminal charges 
dismissed against such confidential informant. 
Upon the information received from the above-referred to 
confidential informant, the Provo City Police went to the address 
of 1498 South 500 West, Provo, Utah, with the confidential 
informant who pointed out the shed after which the police secured 
a search warrant and seized growing marijuana plants as well as 
other marijuana plants which they later observed and which had 
been pulled and were no longer growing from the makeshift shed. 
At no time did the confidential informant nor any other 
person have permission to enter into the shed or onto the 
premises of the defendant and such confidential informant was 
trespassing and any information he obtained was done so 
illegal! I y. 
In addition to the cases previously cited/ the evidence 
should have been suppressed in accordance with the following 
cases. In the case of ^A&feft«§A^egaXgi^fl^jR/ 551 F.2d 767 
(1977) , the Court noted: 
The search and seizure of property by a private individual 
without any governmental involvement is not subject to the 
dictates of the exclusionary rule«..a two pronged analysis 
of allegedly private searches, however, separately analyzes 
the search aspect apart from the actual seizure in order to 
determine whether there was sufficient governmental parti-
cipation in either aspect to require Fourth Amendment 
protection. • .Thus, as in Sfcjy^ 4& an(^ I&LL& when the search 
was held to be a private search/ the inquiry then focused on 
the nature of the seizure and whether it passed consti-
tutional muster. In this case, though the police obtained a 
warrant prior to §jy,&JS£ (Emphasis in original) the films, 
our inquiry into the nature of the search is not obviated 
...It has been held that where a search is physically 
conducted by a private individual but only at the 
governments initiation and under their guidance it is not 
a private search...Searches not so clearly governmental, 
however/ must be judged according to the nature of the 
governmental participation In the search process. 
The case of ffia£fcfiiL£^ 5 3 9 F-2d 1 ( 9 t h 
Circuit/ 1976) gives some guidance in determining when there is a 
private search. As noted in gfe§£KA&: 
In defining a private search/ the Supreme Court has stated 
that the Fourth Amendment applies only if a private party, 
in light of all the circumstances of the case, must be 
regarded as having acted as an instrument or agent of the 
state...Application of this definition/ will frequently/ 
require a careful factual analysis. However, there is 
little difficulty in holding the Fourth Amendment 
inapplicable to the incident case because prior or con-
temporaneous government involvement in the search was 
totally absent...There must be some degree of governmental 
knowledge in acquiesence. In the absence of such 
governmental involvement/ a search is not governmental. 
According to f o o t n o t e number 5 of t h e §feg£V£JaQi. c a s e : 
1 1 
The incident case is relatively simple becuase of the 
total absence of governmental involvement prior to the 
completion of the search. Equally clear is the situa-
tion where governmental involvement in a search is so 
pervasive that it is no longer even nominal private; 
the Fourth Amendment is applicable to such a fjoint 
venture1 because of the intrusive actions of the 
officials therein... 
In gray areas between the two clear situations, search 
may be regarded as a private even though there has been 
some governmental involvement prior to the completion... 
In other cases the actions of private persons may be 
attributed to the government/ as when officers acquiesce 
in the unlawful or outrageous conduct of a private 
person acting solely for a law enforcement purpose...In 
determining whether the Fourth Amendment applies to a 
nominally private search/ the ultimate test — "instrument 
or agents of the state1 — is similar to that used in the 
1
 silver platter1 cases to decide whether the Fourth 
Amendment was applicable to searches conducted .by state 
officers. However/ the factors leading to the ultimate 
conclusion have been treated somewhat differently in two 
contexts...(Fourth amendment applies if there is some 
federal involvement)...(Fourth Amendment applies even 
without federal involvement/ if sole motive of state 
officers is to enforce federal statute). Thus, we do 
not believe the governmental distinction has been 
regarded in the same light as the former federal/state 
distinction. Although the total absence of the 
governmental involvement makes it unnecessary to rely 
on this additional factor/ we observe that the terminal 
managerfs motive was not solely to serve the purposes of 
the government. 
Also see Skafafi^&^J&Ohaxmop, 596 P.2d 190 (Kansas 1979) 
wherein as stated: 
In order to be admissible/ evidence obtained through a 
search by a private individual must come to the state 
upon a 'silver platter1 not as a result of any instigation 
by state officials or participation by them in illegal 
activities...The extent of official involvement in the 
total enterprise is the crucial element/ for if it is 
too great the private individuals role may be reduced 
to that of an agent...Once an agency relationship is 
established/ the full panopoly of constitutional 
provisions and curative measures applies/ and any evidence 
which the police could not legally seize or observe is 
also off limits to the agent. 
The case of Sfe^ L^^ §A=JflYfltfiB* 574 P. 2d 1330 (Hawaii 1978) 
12 
dealt witili a factual situation very similar to ours wherein a 
confidential informant provided information from time to time in 
return for occasional financial reward as determined by the police. 
As wilh tin.-. «:.ii.>i" i 't should OIM iu [MIIHIHI uut that in the 
gff^flj^ftQ case# the confidential informant also did not seize the 
marijuana but merely performed a seach by using a ladder to go on 
the property and see the contraband. Additionally, the officer 
later accompanied the confidential informant the fence, 
however, t;hf» officer c:i:i d iml |>oisona]] y c I • ! - 1 adder or see 
the contraband prior to obtaining the search warrant as were also 
the facts in this case. 
As noted in the aejj&fcgfl. case: 
A subsequent search even under warrant based upon the 
evidence obtained in the former tainted search is also 
tainted. ^^li^^^.Mfc.gSMm/ 48 Haw. 204, 397 P. 2d 
558 (1964); see HfflUUSWLJ^^ 3 7 1 u-s-
471, 88 S. Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed 2d 441 (1963). Evidence 
seized in a tainted search is subject to a motion to 
suppress if it is to be used in a criminal prosecution. 
n$WrM^Mm* 367 U.S. 643, 81 8, Ct. 3 684, 6 L.Ed. 
2d 1081* "(1961) . 
We stated earlier this term in ^^£&^MJ&]{£&£> 58 
Haw. 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977), that a govermental 
intrusion into matters in which an individual possess-
es a "reasonable expectation of privacy" is a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. J^SS^ESLL 
3&i^d§^t££, 389 U. S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed. 
2d 576 (1967) . 
Our task in the instant case is to determine whether 
the informant search of the enclosed area was a private 
search or a governmental search. It has been held that 
where a search is physically conducted by a private 
individual but only at government's initiation and 
under their guidance it is not a private search... 
Further that where civilians fact as agents of the 
police...the full panoply of constitutional provis-
ions and curative measures apply1...We must, however, 
decide that searches not so clearly governmental be 
based according to the extent of the governmental 
participation involved. We hesitate in stating a 
definitive rule as to what elements would constitute 
an agency relationship between a confidential informant 
and the police. In defining a private search/ the 
Supreme Court has stated that the Fourth Amendment 
applies only if a private party, fin light of all the 
circumstances of the case, must be regarded as having 
acted as an instrument or agent of the state1... 
The most prominent indication of such a relationship is 
the officer's admission at the motion to suppress hearing 
that he actively recruited the informant...The issue of 
whether the officer specifically directed the informant 
to search the Appelles1 residence is irrelevant because 
the informant was a governmental agent for Fourth 
Amendment purposes. The informant herein does not seem 
to have had a reason for being at the Appelles1 resi-
dence or for searching the area enclosed by the fence 
which is not inexorably linked to police concerns. The 
officers trip with the informant to the premises for 
the purpose of verifying the information used by this 
officer in his affidavit especially in light of the 
prior recruitment seems to us to be strong evidence of 
the informants symbiotic relationship with the officer... 
Moreover, payment made by the government to the informant 
may be considered with the other surrounding circum-
stances to determine if an informant was acting as an 
instrument of the government or if his search must be 
deemed governmental... 
We distinguished this case from those situations where 
the informant not having been previously recruited and 
upon his own initiative approaches the police with in-
formation independently but perhaps illegally obtained, 
where the requirements of the Fourth Amendment would 
not apply. Such an informant typified as the 'little 
old lady next door1 would be classified ordinarily as a 
citizen informant, rather than a professional or semi-
professional police informant, who is the experienced 
stool pigeon... 
This is not to say that we do not appreciate the use of 
informants in crime detection...Because it is the duty 
of the Court to be watchful for the constitutional rights 
of the citizens, and against any stealthy encroachments 
thereon,...we cannot condone the use by the state of 
information illegally obtained by a semi-professional 
police informant whose sole purpose in this kind of 
endeavor is to gather data to be used in criminal 
prosecutions. 
Reversing the lower court's orders would indicate to 
police informants that they shall be paid rather than 
1 A 
punished for breaching the law. We fear that our 
failure to disapprove the use of information known to 
have been obtained in breach of the law by recruited 
police informants would tempt the police to use persons 
unaffected by the Fourth Amendment restriction to 
obtain evidence which they cannot directly obtain. 
Constitutional limitations on governmental action 
would be severely undercut if the government were 
allowed to actively encourage conduct by fprivate1 
persons or entities that is prohibited to the 
government itself.1 HflJAsfiJ^ supra 
482 F.2d at 904. We cannot allow the constitutional 
prohibition to be circumvented in this manner. 
In the present ease, the only differ ence between oi :ii: case and 
the afore-mentioned cases may be said that the confidential infor-
mant has had at 1! east two felony charges dismissed against him or 
her in return for the information supplied rather than receiving 
direct monetary compensation. 
It can e.it-1
 v. * . the Donf:i dential informant 
received for his information was worth far more than the payment 
of money to him by the Provo City Police, that is* he or she 
completely avoided the possibility of any jail or prison or any 
fine, or ari crimininal record of any kind. 
, there w a s a n I ] J e g a 3 s <= • a r c h b y a j: o I i c e a g e n t 
prior to the issuance of the search warrant. Therefore, the 
search warrant was secured by illegally obtained evidence and the 
marijuana and uLJiet <;iv icfenco must b^ > suppressed as resultii: ig from 
an illegal search and seizure JteBSL^^^ 371 
D. S. 471 (1963). 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING THE MARIJUANA AND ALL 
DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE SEIZED ON OR ABOUT SEPTEMBER 16, 1985, 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 77-35-12 OF TEE UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE IN THAT SUCH SEARCH AND SEIZURE WAS IN VIOLATION 
OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION. 
The wording of Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of 
Utah is identical to the wording of the Fourth Amendment to the 
U. S. Constitution with the exception that Article I, Section 
14 of the Utah Constitution replaces a semi-colon for a comma 
after the word "violated" in the Utah Constitution. 
This of course does not necessarily imply that the meaning 
of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution is identical to 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. 
The question then becomes whether citizens of Utah have any 
greater protection from "unreasonable searches and seizures" than 
do citizens of other states of the Union. 
The case of ^£&iJi£^J^l]9&L&' (nc parallel Utah cite), 581 
P.2d 991 (1972) involved a self help situation wherein the victim 
went to the defendant's apartment without permission and recorded 
serial numbers which such victim then turned over to the police. 
The police secured a search warrant based upon such information 
and the Utah Court in fi§x&ikL3 quoted ^JiSSSSU^ 256 
U. S. 465 (1921) and stated that the Fourth Amendment of the U. 
S. Constitution was only a restraint upon government officers and 
their agents. 
Justice Crockett in the &%fffeg.jkfl case stated in his opinion 
which concurred in result that "We need not go beyond that as to 
whether under some circumstances there may be an 'unreasonable 
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search1 by others than governmental o f f i ce r s* 1 See Utah 
Cons t i tu t ion , Ar t i c l e I , Section 14•w 
Art i c l e I , Section 14 of the Utah c o n s t i t u t i o n was passed in 
i t s o r ig ina l proposed form and without amendment or comment by 
order of the Convention dated May 8, 1895. §^MU&i&L3£££JL%& 
fi&j&ak' P a 9 e 3 1 9 -
Article IIIr Section 7 of the 1889 Constitution of Montana was 
comparable to Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and 
read: 
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, 
homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and 
seizures, and no warrant to search any place or seize 
any person or thing shall issue without describing the 
place to be searched, or the person or thing to be 
seized, nor without probable cause, supported by oath 
or affirmation, reduced to writing. 
In the case of gfcftt^ yftfr,JB&SS*Mi* 4 8 5 P-2d 4 7 (Montana 1971) a 
sister-in-law overheard a threat on an extension telephone to 
which she later testified in court. The Montana Court reversed 
the Second Degree murder charge stating: 
Admission of this testimony violated the defendants Fourth 
Amendment rights under the federal constitution as applied 
to state court criminal proceedings under the fdue process1 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It equally violated 
defendant's rights under Article III, Section 7 of the 
Montana Constitution. 
gflte.Jffi^ tJ^ AL^ .^ 1^y8,6# 389 U. S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 
L. Ed2d 576 established the principle that the "search 
and seizure" provisions of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution protects persons and their 
right to privacy and is not confined to trespass against 
property rights. S&feSL also established that Fourth 
Amendment violations also offend Fifth Amendment guar-
antees against self-incrimination... 
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The state admits this, but contends the protection is 
afforded only against violations by law enforcement 
officers and not against violations by private citizens. 
We think not. The violation of the constitutional right 
to privacy and against compulsory self-incrimination is 
as detrimental to the person to whom the protection is 
guaranteed in the one case as in the other. To distin-
guish between classes of violators is tantamount to 
desruction of the right itself. This Court in 1952, in 
a civil case not involving state or federal governmental 
agents or activity, recognized this principle in the 
following passage from ff^,§fcMry^j£gfcffi/ 125 Mont. 517, 
523, 524, 241 P.2d 816, 819: 
"Continuing the article announces: fThe common 
law has always recognized a man's house as his 
castle, impregnable, often, even to its own 
officers engaged in the execution of its 
commands.11 
"The right of privacy is embraced within the 
absolute rights of personal security and 
personal liberty." 
(Emphasis in original)) 
This Court in the present case would be remiss were it not 
to recognize that evidence obtained by the unlawful or 
unreasonable invasion of several of the constitutionally 
protected rights guaranteed to its citizens by both the 
federal and Montana constitutions properly comes within 
contemplation of this Court's exclusionary rule. To do 
otherwise would lend Court approval to a fictional 
distinction between classes of citizens: those who are 
bound to respect the Constitution and those who are not. 
Were the exclusionary rule to recognize such distinctions 
it would by indirection circumvent the rule established 
by this Court to enforce these rights and would in fact 
render the rule and the constitutional guarantees it 
protects meaningless. 
A new Montana State Constitution was ratified by its citizens 
June 6, 1972. 
The 1972 Montana Constitution provided in Article II, Section 
and 11 as follows: 
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Section 10. Right of privacy. The right of individual 
privacy is essential to the wellbeing of a free society 
and shall not be infringed without the showing of a 
compelling state interest* 
Section 11, Searches and Seizures. The people shall 
be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant 
to search any place, or seize any person or thing shall 
issue without describing the place to be searched or the 
person or thing to be seized, or without probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing. 
The Montana Constitution therefore expanded on the concept of 
right to privacy in its Constitution of 1972. 
The case of ^fl^ai5fi^4^ttrAft 5 3 0 p- 2 d 4 4 2 (Montana 1974) 
involved a manager of a McDonaldfs Restaurant who turned over 
marijuana to the police which was in the possession of one of 
his employees. 
The Court in Gpfol^Q quoted extensively from the case of 
6&S£feitfl a n d additionally noted certain statutory exceptions to the 
requirements of a search warrant. It is worth noting that Utah 
does not have statutory exceptions to search warrants as is the 
case in Montana. 
The Court in Qohiujl stated: 
Also, the federal constitution contains no specific section 
establishing a separate and independent right of privacy as 
does the 1972 Montana Constitution. The United States 
Constitution recognizes the right as part of the First, 
Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments... 
So far as privacy is concerned gj|£& recognized the Fourth 
Amendment was not a general right of privacy but the right 
was contained in the Fourth and several other amendments, 
the First, Third and the Fifth, and as stated in &ya& at 
p. 350 of 389 U. S. at p. 511 of 88 S. Ct. at p. 581 of 
19 L.Ed.2d in reference to the right of privacy: 
...his right to be let alone by other pople — is like the 
protection of his property and of his very life, left 
largely to the law of the individual States... 
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Concerning the exclusionary rule itself it would be weir 
to consider first that the "exclusionary rule" is a court 
adopted rule resting on the "rule making" and supervisory 
power of the Supreme Court over the other courts and has 
no roots in the constitution or the statutes of the state 
or federal government... 
The facts that the rule is characterized as not satisfactory 
and the state in argument recommended that a tort remedy for 
the aggrieved was adequate, simply ignores that all of the 
cases which declare the rule as a deterrent because the 
wrong cannot be corrected or compensated, but merely 
avoided in the future, must have recognized that there 
could be no price placed on a constitutional right... 
In
 §!&£&&' t h e court said: 
"The exclusionary rule has for decades been the subject 
of ardent controversy. The arguments of its antagonists 
and of its proponents have been so many times marshalled 
as to require no lengthy elaboration here." 
It is, however, noteworthy to comment on its application 
and the "silver platter doctrine1 that resulted. The 
first application of the rule, in 1914, applied only to 
the federal court system and only excluded tainted 
evidence obtained by federal officers and as a result 
the so-called "silver platter doctrine" was developed, 
i.e. state officers could violate a person's constitu-
tional right and hand the evidence to the federal 
officers (on a silver platter) and such evidence could 
be used in the federal court because no federal officer 
was physically involved in the violation. 
This practice was recognized but ignored for over 40 
years until filJyt£&. In that case, the "silver platter 
doctrine" was finally discredited. SJiyJlgL went on to 
observe that it is unlikely factual data could be 
assembled to demonstrate that the exclusionary rule 
was unworkable and in some depth demonstrated the 
opposite conclusion. Of more interest, Elkins cites 
with approval as a ground for rejecting the so-called0 
"silver platter doctrine": 
But there is another consideration—the imperative of 
judicial integrity...fPor those who agree with me,1 
said Mr. Justice Holmes, fno distinction can be taken 
between the Goverment as prosecutor and the Government 
as judge.1 277 D. S. at page 470, 48 S.Ct. at page 
575. (Dissenting opinion.) fIn a goverment of laws,1 
said Mr. Justice Erandeis, fexistence of the government 
will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law 
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scrupulously. Our Government is the potent/ the 
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches 
the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. 
If the goverment becomes a law-breaker, it breeds 
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a 
law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare 
that in the administration of the criminal law the 
end justifies the means — to declare that the 
government may commit crimes in order to secure the 
conviction of a private criminal — would bring 
terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine 
this court should resolutely set its face... 
The argument that the exclusionary rule is wedded to 
the sovereign because the organized officialdom are 
the only ones that can be deterred because the injury 
to the victim cannot be restored or reparation comes 
too late, and that all others would have no prosecution 
motive and could not be familiar with the rule is an 
unwarranted generalization that completely disregards 
the changes that have taken place in our political 
and social structure and the legal impact of the cases 
on the subject since the rule was announced in 
frUEflfiftft in 1921... 
Finally, it fails altoghether to recognize the massive 
increase in the incidents of the invasions of the right 
of privacy of the private citizen or the scientific 
advances that have made this possible, even though the 
United States congress has finally recognized the 
problem and has given it priority consideration. 
Further, the arguments erroneously characterize the 
"private person11 as the little old lady next door who 
has a desire to assist in law enforcement. When in 
fact a great many of the pure Fourth Amendment cases 
cited by the state involve "institutional", "quasi" 
or "private" police, i.e., airport guards, building 
security personnel, private detectives and we also 
have private corporation police like railroad police 
and self-help groups and investigators for political 
committees. Experience simply does not cast these 
groups of "private" persons in the minority. The 
standards agreed to by the state simply do not fit 
this segment of the private sector. Methods designed 
to protect the multiple rights of the whole of our 
citizenry are not intended to free criminals or 
discourage the participation of citizens in the 
enforcement of our laws. 
If one considers that any exclusionary process only 
excludes "unreasonable" conduct it can readily be 
seen that all intrusions are not unreasonable. Like 
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it or not unreasonable or illegal intrusions know-
ingly accepted and used, from the private sector 
by the government amount to an extension of the 
silver platter doctrine condemned by BJJjJLfiyS' 
particularly when viewed in the light of judicial 
integrity emphasized in £iMM* It: kas be^n argued 
t h a t
 fiiMai d i d n o t disturb fe££gg£U' it: maY n o t h a v e 
been clear in the pure Fourth Amendment context/ but 
a close examination does move one to believe that the 
silver platter concept was condemned in any context. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized an individuals right to 
privacy and the right to be left alone in &&g^J^^Ji&££&£, 671 
P.2d 175 (Utah, 1983). 
The Court in gg^J^g, noted: 
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in 
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve 
as private, even in an area accessible to the public 
may be constitutionally protected. l^JLJJSUJBDJAaS. 
SfcfltSftF 389 U. S. 347, 351, 88 S. Ct. "507, 511, 19 L. 
Ed.2d 576, 582 (1967). Subsequent to the ggj^ 
decision much emphasis was given to the twofoLd 
requirement advanced in the concurring opinion of 
Harlan, J. at 389 U. S. 361, 88 St. Ct. 516, 19 L. 
Ed2d 588 that the defendant must have a subjective 
expectation of privacy and that society is prepared 
to recognize that expectation as reasonable... 
What re-emerges, consistent with &§£&/ is the maxim 
of Justice Erandeis1 QiffiiifeBflfl. dissent which fore-
shadowed the precept that government protects people, 
not places: 
[The makers of our Constitution] conferred, as against 
the government, the right to be left alone — the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjusti-
fiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy 
of the individual, whatever the means employed, must 
be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment... 
There are of course justifiable intrusions when the 
right to be let alone must yield to the right of 
search. aSOfflfiSUSUE^ ^ 3 3 3 u- s- 10' 
68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948), but as a rule 
that justification must be sanctioned by a judicial 
officer and not asserted in the discretion of a 
government official because "searches conducted 
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outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only 
to a few specifically established and well delinated 
exceptions-n gft^nft^a 389 D- s- at 357' 88 s- ct-
at 514, 19 L.Ed2d at 585. And the burden is on 
those seeking exemption to show the need* & ^ M & & ' 
The intervention of a neutral magistrate not only 
guarantees a lawful search of a suspected offender, 
but in a large sense it protects society against 
the erosion of those cherished rights that are 
still not taken for granted in many parts of the 
world. Courts do not enforce these procedural 
requirements to sanction the activities of one 
single individual, but to assure all citizens 
those continuing fundamental rights... 
Inasmuch as the intiial search and seizure was 
illegal, all subsequent contraband was "come at by the 
exploitation of that illegality" and may not be used 
against the defendant. JBfflaJS^^^ 
371 U. S. 471, 88 S. Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed2d 441 (1963); 
&9^3L&t*M&i 3 6 7 u- s- 6 4 3' 8 1 s-ct- 1 6 8 4' 6 L-Ed-
2d 1081 (1961). 
Finally, the case of g j ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ l i ^ ^ 600 *-2d 816 
(Montana 1979) involves as close a situation as can be imagined 
which could be characterized as the "little old lady next door 
who desires to assist in law enforcement." 
In the case of g^fjJlsil/ a neighbor illegally trespassed on 
the defendant's property and took a sample of what turned out to 
be marijuana after the police had failed to see any marijuana 
which had been previously reported by the neighbor. 
The Court in ggj^&igk stated: 
The framers of the 1972 Constitution indicated the right 
of individual privacy was significant whatever the source 
of the invasion. The delegate who introduced the proposed 
privacy section reflected these concerns: 
...Certainly, back in 1776, 1789 when they 
developed our bill of rights the search and 
seizure provisions were enough, when a raanfs 
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home was his castle and the state could not 
intrude upon this home without the procuring 
of a search warrant with probable cause being 
stated before a magistrate and a search 
warrant being issued. No other protection 
was necessary and this certainly was the 
greatest amount of protection that any free 
society has given its individuals. In that 
type of a society, of course, the neighbor 
was maybe three or four miles away. There 
was no real infringement upon the individual 
and his right of privacy. However, today we 
have observed an increasingly complex society 
and we know our area of privacy has decreased 
decreased and decreased..." Tr. of the Montana 
Constitutional Convention, Vol. VII, pp. 5180-81. 
Later in the same statement, the scope of the delegates1 
concern was addressed: 
"...It isn't only a careless government that has 
this power to pry, political organizations, private 
information gathering firms, and even an individual 
can now snoop more easily and more effectively than 
ever before..." Tr. at p. 5182. 
A search and seizure such as the one executed by Mrs. 
Arnold amounts to a significant invasion of individual 
privacy... 
Because the search of the Helfrich property was based 
upon the fruit of an unlawful trespass, the District Court 
acted properly in suppressing the evidence and granting 
the defendant's motion to dismiss. 
In the present case under consideration, the Provo City 
Police are attempting to do indirectly what they cannot do 
directly. The mere fact that the police gave the confidential 
informant no direction as to what he could or could not do 
legally shows a gross lack of concern for citizens constitutional 
rights. The only testimony before the court is that the confid-
ential informant was on the defendant's property without his 
permission, i.e., trespassing. Additionally, the transcript 
appears to show that not only were the police not concerned with 
how the information was gathered, but that in fact the police 
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never even asked. 
To say the least/ it seems abundantly clear that there was an 
unreasonable search by the confidential informant prior to the 
issuance of the warrant/ and therefore/ there was an unreasonable 
search and seizure which requires the suppression of all evidence 
seized. Article I# Section 14 of the Utah Constitution protects 
against "unreasonable searches" regardless of whom performs such 
search. No language in the Utah Constitution suggests that 
illegal searches by private persons are permissible anymore than 
governmental searches are. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE GUILTY VERDICT 
OF UNLAWFUL PRODUCTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
The only evidence that was introduced at the trial could 
allow at most the trial court to infer the defendant/ Allan R. 
Watts/ and the co-defendant/ Debbie Watts occupied a dwelling at 
1498 South 500 West/ ProvO/ Utah/ and that marijuana was being 
cultivated or produced in a make shift greenhouse not exposed to 
public view some fifty feet away by someone. 
Indeed the prosecutor stated "We don't know who grew them. 
We could not begin to carryr beyond a reasonable doubt/ a burden 
to show that both plants were grown by this defendant (R. 212). 
The prosecution's states several times that the marijuana 
was cultivated by someone/ but the state never proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt who that someone was (R. 214-217). 
While the defendant doesnft assert the statefs commenting on 
the defendant's failure to testify as error in this non-jury 
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trial (although he probably should), it is clear the state was 
attempting to shift the burden to the defendant to prove he was 
not guilty (R. 212, R. 216-217). 
The case of &%§^JiM^£<&m£> 30 U.2d 125, 514 P.2d 793, 
(Utah/ 1973) set forth the necessary proof the state is required 
to show unlawful production of a controlled substance beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In the £&&£&££ case an individual discovered 
in one of his fields that someone was cultivating two small 
patches of plants which he suspected were marijuana. He 
contacted the local authorities who made an examination of the 
area. The plants were growing on high grounds and were not 
watered by irrigation. Depressions were found adjacent to the 
plants and the grounds surrounding the plants was moist. Buckets 
and jugs were found near a creek which was a short distance from 
the marijuana. Additionally/ foot prints led from the area to 
the creek. After the police had put the area under surveillance/ 
they observed the defendant crossing over the field near the area 
where the marijuana plant was growing and did further observe the 
defendant picking leaves from one of the plants and placing it in 
a plastic bag. Additionally, the defendant made incriminating 
statements. The Court in &gj?£Qfc£ noted, "the evidence taken 
as a whole could only support a charge that the defendant was in 
possession of marijuana. Possession alone is insufficient to 
show the defendant cultivated or produced the substance." 
The concurring opinion written by Justice Eenriod in §£&£&££ 
stated that: 
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The transcript is devoid of any evidence connecting the 
defendant with tilling of the soil, planting, watering, 
or fertilizing any marijuana plants, [and] should be 
considered at least as an unorthodox but nonetheless 
intended effort to apprise this Court as a matter 
prejudicial in one degree or another to his interest, 
based on the differential between improper accusation 
and any attempt to correct it by so-called curative 
instruction. 
Therefore the State of Utah must show not only that the 
defendant was in constructive possession of the marijuana but 
must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he produced such 
substance by proving that he did till the soil, was involved 
in planting, watering or fertilizing the marijuana plants, 
confessed to such activity or otherwise produced such marijuana 
plants. The state cannot merely infer the facts without more 
as is indicated in §£&£2f£. 
By following the states theory, the individual owner of the 
property in the S9JU^££ case would have been guilty of unlawful 
production of a controlled substance. (R. 216). 
And it must constantly be remembered that all that can be 
inferred from the evidence is that the defendant, Allan R. Watts, 
and his codefendant, Debbie Watts, occupied the dwelling. There 
was no evidence to show they occupied or owned any surrounding 
land nor any evidence connecting defendant with the marijuana in 
the makeshift greenhouse. 
And before unlawful production of a controlled substance can 
be found, there must be a showing of at least constructive 
possession as stated in §£&£&££• 
As noted in &fca£fi^ £»,.XQX.f 20 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, (Utah, 1985): 
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Knowledge and ability to possess do not equal possession 
where there is no evidence of intent to make use of the 
knowledge and ability. 
To find that a defendant had constructive possession of a 
drug or other contraband, it is necessary to prove that 
there was a sufficient nexus between the accused and the 
drug to permit an inference that the accused had both the 
power and intent to exercise dominion and control over the 
drug • . . 
Whether a sufficient nexus between the acused and the drug 
exists depends on the facts and circumstances of each case 
••.Ownership and/or occupancy of the premises upon which 
the drugs are found, although important factors, are 
not alone sufficient to establish constructive possession, 
especially when occupancy is not exclusive. ^itj^JSkatfifl 
ya^riR&%4g/ 562 Fed. 2d 681, 693 (D. C. Circuit 1977). 
See also ^^L^Y^^M^^m^ *68 P-2d 1258 (Utah, 1983), 
wherein it is stated in the concurring three-member majority 
opinion of the Court reversing the trial Court that: 
Lana Anderton's conviction on this charge was based solely 
on her joint ownership of the residence in the home where 
the drugs were found. 
There is substantial support for the rule that where a 
defendant is in non-exclusive possession or occupancy 
of the premises on which controlled substance are found, 
there must be some additional incriminating evidence to 
establish guilt of possession: Proof of a proprietary 
interest in or regular occupancy of a premises §^gag. 
[emphasis in the original] is not sufficient to prove 
constructive possession. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court improperly admitted evidence as a result 
of an illegal search and seizure and should have suppressed all 
evidence seized on or about September 16, 1985, and all other 
evidence derived therefrom, pursuant to Section 77-35-12 of the 
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure in that such search and seizure 
was in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and in violation of Article I, Section 
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14 of the Dtah State Constitution. 
Therefore, the trial Court's decision should be reversed with 
instructions to suppress such evidence. 
Additionally, the verdict of guilty should be reversed for 
insufficient evidence to sustain the guilty verdict of Unlawful 
Production of a Controlled Substance and the case should be 
remanded for the purpose of discharging him. 
Respectfully submitted this J^.^J^ day of May, 1986. 
GREGOl®' ML^ WARNER 
Attorney \£pr Appellant 
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NOALL T. WOOTTON 
Utah County Attorney 
Room 107, County Building 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 373-5510 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiff, : AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
-vs- : 
CASE NO, 9911 
ALLAN R. WATTS 
DEBBIE WATTS, 
Defendants, 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, District Court Judge, on the 25th 
day of November, 1985, at the hour of 9:30 a.m. The plaintiff 
was represented by its attorney, Wayne B. Watson, Chief Deputy 
County Attorney, and the defendants were ooth present ana 
represented by their counsel, Gregory M. Warner, esq. The court 
having heard the evidence presented by the parties now rakes ana 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The court finds that the residence of both defendants 
located at 1498 South 500 West, Provo, Utah County, was searched 
by Detective Bradle> S. Leatham of the Provo City Police 
Department and other officers in assistance on September 16, 
1985. 
2. The court finds that said search was conducted by 
authority of a search ana seizure warrant issued by Judge E. 
Patrick McGuire of the Eighth Circuit Court of Provo Department, 
Utah County, State of Utah, on September 16, 1985. 
3. The court finds that the affidavit in support of said 
search warrant declared that a confidential informant within the 
last 24 hours prior to execution of said affidavit observed on 
the premises at least four large marijuana plants being grown in 
a makeshift greenhouse on the property. 
4. The court finds that no evidence was presented which 
would provide a basis for finding that the confidential informant 
who was relied upon in the issuance of said search warrant was 
acting as an agent for the police department nor that anything 
was seized at the time of said confidential informant's initial 
observation of the contraband. 
Wherefore, having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact, 
the court now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court concludes that the defendants' motion to 
Suppress should be denied, there oeing no evioence presentee to 
demonstrate agency on behalf of the confidential informant nor 
any evidence presented that any items were seized by saia 
confidential informant acting in his capacity as a representative 
or agent of the law enforcement agency. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the Motion to Suppress of defendants is hereby denied. 
Dated this ^""^ day of November, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
AtTLfeN B. SORENSEN, Judge 
Fourth Judicial District 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order to Gregory M. 
Warner, Attorney for Defendant, at P.Oi Box "L", Provo, Utah 





NOALL T. WOOTTON 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Room 107, County Building 
Provo, Utah 84601 
373-5510 Ext. 210 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNT 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT 
vs. : 
ALLAN R. WATTS, : Case No. 9911 
Defendant. : 
This matter came before this Court for trial to the bench 
on the 16th day of January, 1986. The Court having heard the 
testimony now enters the following findings of fact. 
1. The growing marijuana was located within a shed, half 
of which had been converted into a rough greenhouse. 
2. The shed was located within the fenced yard of a single 
family dwelling. 
3. The defendant and his spouse were the only residents 
of that dwelling. 
4. The marijuana was under obvious cultivation, being 
pruned, watered and tied to the ceiling of the portion of the 
shed which had been lined with plastic. 
5. Mo testimony placed any individuals other than the 
defendant, his spouse and their minor children at the residence, 
6. The telephone to the residence is in the name of the 
defendant. 
7. That the defendant had non-exclusive dominion or 
control over the area where the marijuana was found. 
DATED this day of , 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED as to form: 
-2-
